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PERSONALITY DISORDER AND THE LAW: SOME AWKWARD QUESTIONS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article raises five key problems for the law in its 
dealings with those with severe personality disorder. These 
problems are set in the context of a legislative agenda that 
has embraced the conflicting objectives of rehabilitation and 
incapacitation, whilst striving to improve treatment for 
those with severe personality disorder, and minimising the 
risk that they are thought to pose to themselves or others. 
The problems are examined from the perspectives of 
legislators, realists, clinicians and courts, empiricists 
and, finally, normativists; in short, what should the law be 
doing in this arena? The article concludes by urging a 
cautionary adherence to issues of legal principle in 
preference to the, albeit starkly portrayed, alternatives: 
namely, the seductive attractions of therapeutic 
intervention, or the destructive effects of indeterminate 
containment.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and 
should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood. (Article 1, Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 1948)  
 
This resounding statement encapsulates a number problematic 
themes for lawyers with respect to personality disorder, and 
acutely so for the extremes of personality disorder embraced 
by designations such as psychopathy or dangerous and severe 
personality disorder (DSPD). These designations, discussed 
further below, are in themselves contentious; they do not 
have commonly agreed definitions either across disciplines or 
across jurisdictions. Morse (2008), for example, argues in a    
fascinating account that psychopaths should be absolved from 
criminal responsibility for crimes that violate the moral 
rights of others, but that those with anti-social personality 
disorder should be held responsible. Equally challenging 
implications arise from the empirical work of the MacArthur 
group (Monahan, Steadman, Silver, Appelbaum, Robbins, Mulvey, 
Roth, Grisso and Banks, 2001) which indicates that it is not 
the affective and interpersonal ‘deficits’ typical of 
psychopaths that are linked to violence, but rather the 
socially deviant and irresponsible dimensions of their 
personalities.   
In one sense, the precise disorder alleged or term employed 
is not critical here, for what is of interest is, as Vincent 
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essentially asks (2008:199), how those differences in 
people’s make-up affects their mental capacities to act as  
responsible moral agents?  Moreover, what these assorted 
terms do have in common is that people with personality 
disorder are largely judged by the law to have capacity and 
therefore do not benefit from the special protections offered 
to those found to be insane. Yet, those very same personality 
disordered people may not be able to ‘act towards one another 
in a spirit of brotherhood’ because their ability to exercise 
control as others might over their behaviour is impaired, 
albeit not extinguished.  
This article poses five problems arising out of this 
disjunction, and in so doing questions whether those with 
personality disorder are treated fairly by the law. The five 
problems to be addressed are: do those with severe 
personality disorder have the cognitive capacity to 
understand wrong; can the graded concept of capacity and the 
blunter concept of rational responsibility be aligned; is the 
ability of those with severe personality disorder to control 
themselves impaired by a lack of a conventional moral 
conscience and/or the cognitive ability to restrain 
themselves; does a lay (mis)understanding of personality 
disorder and the vocal victims’ voice impede reform; does 
difficulty in defining the target group make it impossible to 
focus reform initiatives? However, it starts with a brief 
diversion into the ‘Rule of Law’ in order to provide some 
context for the problems that follow.  
 
FIVE PROBLEMS FOR THE LAW 
Legal egalitarianism, the principle that all, regardless of 
status, are equally subject to the law of the realm, is one 
uncontentious aspect of the rule of law (Bingham 2010; Dicey 
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1915) It would necessarily require that those with 
personality disorder are treated as equals. The second 
relevant principle is that no-one can be punished without a 
breach of law proven in an ordinary court; thus punishment 
will only be imposed on those who demonstrably have infringed 
the law. And, as Bingham powerfully observes (2010:9), the 
‘hallmarks of a regime which flouts the rule of law are, 
alas, all too familiar’. 
Yet the rule of law also stresses the need for certainty and 
for clarity (Raz 1979). Law should be prospective and not 
retrospective in nature: if people are to be liable to 
punishment they should at least have fair warning of that law 
and the capacity to comply with it. Thus, the capacity for 
cognitive knowledge of legal wrong would seem the most basic 
of pre-requisites.  Yet complying with that knowledge 
requires other abilities and, as is argued further below, the 
law may not yet properly embrace that concept for those with 
severe forms of personality disorder.   
This first problem for the law arises in part because, in 
England and Wales at least, knowledge of wrong for the 
purposes of the protections offered to the ‘insane’ by the 
M’Naghten Rules has been interpreted in this narrow sense as 
knowledge of legal wrong.  The position elsewhere, and in 
particular in the United States, is more complex (see 
Sinnott-Armstrong and Levy 2011). A requirement for knowledge 
of legal wrong  will exclude the vast majority of those with 
personality disorder from this limb of the M’Naghten defense, 
for this defense is confined to those who are so mentally 
ill, from ‘disease of the mind’, that they are meaningfully 
unaware of the law’s restraints. That those with disease of 
the mind are exempt from the underlying legal maxim that 
‘ignorance of the law is no defense’, is based on the 
unfairness that would otherwise arise: thus the law draws a 
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distinction between those who cannot and those who do not 
‘know the law’.  However, the basis of even this distinction 
has recently been challenged in a powerful critique by 
Ashworth (2010).  This critique begins to open up a more 
nuanced approach to how responsibility should be attributed, 
both amongst those whose ‘state of ignorance’ is not 
attributable to disorder and potentially, for the personality 
disordered.   
That lack of capacity does justify the exceptional treatment 
of those ‘without reason’ is clear; indeed, special 
provisions exist in many jurisdictions so that those who are 
‘insane’ – in that they do not know, in a conventional sense, 
what they are doing - cannot be held culpable, and hence 
liable to punishment for their behaviour, where the identical 
behaviour in others would constitute a criminal offence. Yet 
those with personality disorder are largely held to have this 
kind of understanding or ‘reason’ – they do know what they 
are doing - and so are excluded from an otherwise 
paternalistic regime which  treats those who lack capacity 
broadly in accordance with their best interests.  Indeed, in 
some jurisdictions the law has explicitly excluded those 
whose repeated criminal or anti-social behaviour might 
otherwise have been considered to constitute a mental 
disorder from the protections offered by an insanity defense 
(see generally Sinnott-Armstrong and Levy 2011, on the effect 
of the Model Penal Code in the US).   
However, capacity is itself a problematic concept and this 
constitutes the second problem area for the law. 
Psychologists would argue that capacity is a functional 
concept and that individuals should not be thought of as 
having or lacking capacity: an individual may have the 
capacity to make one decision but not another where those 
decisions vary in complexity.  An individual’s capacity to 
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make particular decisions or do specific things will vary in 
time and in interaction with the support provided. The Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 in England and Wales recognises this (see 
for example, s.1(3)) in its core principles with respect to 
how capacity is assessed and how decisions should be made for 
those who do not have the capacity to make them.  
However, the criminal law is much more abrupt in its approach 
so those with personality disorder will encounter both the 
nuanced variety applied above by the civil law and its 
blunter compatriot in criminal law. There degrees of capacity 
are barely recognised beyond the limited defense of 
diminished responsibility to murder.  And even that defense 
does not exculpate but works primarily as a device, following 
conviction for the lesser offence of manslaughter, to 
mitigate punishment.  Furthermore, the majority of those 
verdicts of manslaughter (attributed to diminished 
responsibility) do not result in hospital disposals and 
rarely apply (although they are applicable) to those with 
personality disorder.  
This second problem, arising out of differing notions of 
capacity and its applicability in different areas, can be 
crystallised in the knotty question of whether the concepts 
of capacity and rational responsibility are analogous. If 
decisions are made by people with personality disorder that 
would not seem reasoned to others, will they nonetheless be 
regarded as decisions made with capacity by those who judge 
their behaviour according to current legal principles? This 
is not an easy question to unpack. Under the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005, capacity and reason are not analogous: indeed, 
merely making an unwise decision would be an insufficient 
basis on which to conclude that a person lacked capacity. But 
would a decision over which one has not exercised ‘choice’ be 
regarded as capacitous, by which I mean one made by a person 
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with sufficient capacity in law to make the decision in 
question? Charland (2002), for example, asks whether one can 
be said to have given capacitous consent to taking medically 
prescribed heroin in a research trial if one is already 
addicted to heroin.  Much of this turns around threshold 
questions: how much capacity is required to be able to make 
particular decisions with consequences of varying severity?  
Pitching the threshold low enables problematic decisions to 
be made by those who might arguably need to be protected from 
the consequences of those decisions; pitching it high will 
deprive individuals of autonomy but protect them from taking 
culpable decisions for which they might subsequently be 
punished. The temptation is to equate capacity with what 
other people might regard as reasonable (or reasoned) 
decisions, but this fundamentally undermines the notion that 
we all value things differently, and that these values ought 
to be protected within a democratic society insofar as is 
‘reasonably’ possible.    
Third, stereotypically those with extremes of personality 
disorder and, in particular, ‘psychopathy’ have been held not 
to have a conventional conscience: in clinical and research 
terms this has been portrayed as such individuals lacking the  
emotional component that is normally associated with a 
cognitive appreciation of the meaning of life’s experiences 
(Cleckley 1976).  Or put another way, they may experience 
problems with feeling guilt, empathising with their victims, 
learning from their experiences, and indeed responding to 
punishment (Blair, Mitchell and Blair 2005).  This can 
jeopardise both rehabilitative and treatment endeavours. 
Whether this lack of a moral conscience should also absolve 
psychopathic offenders from criminal culpability, albeit not 
state intervention, is another pertinent question (Morse 
2008). Indeed, as Morse sets out (2008:209) it is possible 
that the failure of psychopaths to restrain themselves (see 
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below) is not due to some irresistible impulse but rather to 
an inability, due to rational deficits, to identify good 
reasons for that restraint.  
However, it has recently been suggested that the assertion of 
an emotional deficit, a form of emotional detachment, may not 
be wholly accurate (see generally Pham, Durco and Luminet  
2010). Psychopaths may be able to identify feelings even if 
they don’t respond to them in a conventional sense; in short, 
they are emotionally intelligent, but are able to use this 
intelligence to their own advantage because they perceive 
themselves as being better able to manage and regulate their 
emotional states. Neutral observers would not necessarily 
endorse this unique view, but the analysis would be 
consistent with a view of psychopaths as having the capacity 
to be both manipulative and charming (Hare 2003).  Some have 
even argued that such individuals can exploit these deemed 
deficits, leading to the concept of ‘callous empathy’ coined 
by Book, Quinsey and Langford (2007). Much has also recently 
been made of the explanatory force of empathy, or its 
absence, across a range of personality disorders (Baron-Cohen 
2011) leading to questions about the appropriateness of 
punishing those with empathetic deficits; whether such 
questions would run contrary to the findings of the MacArthur 
group referred to earlier, at least insofar as psychopaths 
were concerned, remains an issue.  
Such psychological ‘deficits’ may, of course, protect those 
with personality disorder both from the emotional and 
traumatic consequences of their own crimes and enable them 
better to survive detention in either prisons or psychiatric 
hospitals. And, in non-institutional, commercial and 
professional contexts, these ‘deficits’, when combined with 
high levels of conscientiousness, have indeed been known to 
be advantageous (for the latest illustration see Mullins-
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Sweatt Glover, Derefinko,  Miller and Widiger 2010).  These 
authors assert that it is differences in conscientiousness 
that makes the difference between successful and unsuccessful 
psychopaths. What constitutes psychopathy is thus 
contentious: although there may be agreement on the core 
traits, some of these traits may be adaptive in different 
settings and some independently adaptive traits, for example 
fearlessness, may not be included in a designation of 
psychopathy based exclusively on maladaptive traits. 
As our understanding of the psychological traits that may or 
may not underpin personality disorder become increasingly 
sophisticated, the law’s response remains, perhaps 
understandably, relatively static. And quite how the law 
should respond to those who do not adhere to its underlying 
precepts creates this third set of problems. Their essence is 
this: before punishment can be imposed the law requires that 
culpability be proven on the basis of capacitous law-
breaking. But what is to be done about those who retain 
capacity in a conventional clinical sense, but who 
nonetheless either lack the ability voluntarily to control 
their behaviour in the conventional sense, or whose ability 
is impaired? Thus, whilst lawyers may be happy to draw a 
bright dividing line between those who don’t and those who 
can’t control their behaviour, in the field of personality 
disorder these distinctions are not so easy.  What is to be 
done about those who may be conventionally culpable in the 
sense that they knowingly caused injury to another, but who 
may not merit punishment because they were unable fully to 
control their behaviour? Or because their own psychological 
make-up impairs their capacity to respond as others might, or 
enables them to respond as other’s would not or could not? 
Factors such as a low tolerance for frustration and 
impulsivity, combined with substance misuse facilitated by 
impaired moral reasoning, can make for a murky picture: and 
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yet such maladaptive traits will be placed into a context 
where, since those with personality disorder remain capable 
of instrumental reasoning to achieve their goals, the 
capacity to respond to moral reasoning will remain, at least 
in part (see Glannon 2008). In short, should those with 
personality disorder be dealt with differently by the law 
because their capacity to control themselves is impaired, 
albeit not extinguished? And is this a matter of mitigation 
and partial excuse, rather than exculpation?   
This is important when one considers what interventions are 
appropriate for those with personality disorder: in law one 
needs to be found criminally responsible before punishment 
can be imposed but just because one is culpable in that legal 
sense does not mean that punishment should necessarily result 
– treatment may be aimed at augmenting an ‘offender’s’ 
ability to control their behaviour and this may be a 
preferable outcome to mere punishment. This lack of clarity 
is not assisted in England and Wales, where sentencers are 
currently required to have regard to a number of purposes 
including, but not limited to, both punishment and 
rehabilitation (see Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.142(1)). Yet, 
if there is a fault in an individual’s control mechanisms, 
then maybe the attribution of culpability should not be a 
black and white affair.  At one level the law recognises 
these distinctions with its rules on legal and factual 
causation, but the application of these rules is arguably 
harsh since, at least insofar as legal causation is 
concerned, the law will hold blameworthy (in the sense that 
it regards it as fair to hold them liable) an agent whose 
contribution to the event is partial. Thus, the law asks were 
the defendant’s actions ‘a’ cause of the event, albeit not 
‘the’ only cause?  Whilst the critical question might be did 
the individual have sufficient control to be held culpable 
for this partial contribution to events (a binary decision), 
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the notion of partial causal responsibility goes only to 
inculpate not exculpate. 
Fourth, and leading on from this, those who offend in the 
context of severe personality disorder have not acted 
‘towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood’.  This poses 
further problems for legislators, policy-makers and 
clinicians since it brings into the equation the interests 
not only of the personality disordered individual but also an 
unquantifiable ‘other’ presence.  The existence of a vocal 
and seriously injured section of the public may in turn 
combine with a further significant proportion of the wider 
public who may live in fear, justified or not, of becoming 
victims. And this fear may be inappropriately fed by a common 
lay misunderstanding about the nature of personality 
disorder, and in particular, of the term psychopathy.  This 
can create a momentum for those very legislators and policy-
makers to act, and for clinicians to respond. 
But what is to be done? And about whom? And this latter 
question poses a fifth category of problem for lawyers since 
it is not at all clear that there is agreement about the 
category of individual for whom special measures might be 
justified.  Are they to be identified on the basis of their 
offending behaviour (in which case, of what type of offence, 
of what severity and of what frequency?); or are they to be 
identified according to the threat of offending they pose (in 
which case on the basis of what evidence: past offending or 
of some personal characteristics of the individual, 
presumably the underlying personality disorder?). And with 
what degree of certainty are such predictions or judgments to 
be made in order that they be legally persuasive? Moreover, 
it should be stressed that these questions are not merely 
theoretical: the law currently permits the long-term 
detention of those with personality disorder where 
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appropriate treatment is available (albeit treatment with no 
necessary guarantee of effectiveness) even in the absence of 
proven culpable offending.  
And finally, all of these problems need to be addressed in 
the context of considerable uncertainty amongst the clinical 
and research community about what the nature of the disorders 
are, whether they are indeed treatable, remediable or 
manageable, and how one might know when improvement has come 
about without taking risks with what may be a population that 
may have been proven to be capable of the most serious forms 
of violent or sexual offending. And yet these uncertainties 
are played out against a legislative and policy agenda which 
can be as much influenced by inappropriate certainty about 
what needs to be done and by a public misunderstanding of 
severe personality disorder, as by any well-informed or 
balanced approach to personality disorder.  In short, the law 
has yet properly to grapple with what would constitute a fair 
response to the very real problems those with personality 
disorder pose: a more graded approach, which would recognise 
degrees of responsibility appropriate to the range of complex 
capacities all people have, might be one way forward.   
The next sections of this article now shift to examining 
these problems from the perspectives of a number of players, 
including both those who work in direct contact with those 
with personality disorder, and of those who juggle more 
remotely with what the law is or ought to be.  The first 
section starts by looking in brief at the recent legislative 
reform initiatives in the unique area of ‘dangerous and 
severe personality disorder’ – and unique in the sense that 
this was a designation unrecognised by either clinicians or 
legislators.   
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A (parochial) legislator’s view  
In England and Wales, the most recent legislative initiatives 
have been based seemingly on a view of the severely 
personality disordered as encapsulating a very needy but 
inappropriately neglected group.  Hence, in 1999 a government 
document which launched the DSPD programme of reform asserted  
Dangerous severely personality disordered people often 
do not get the help they need to manage the consequences 
of their disorder. Most have a lifelong history of 
profound difficulties from an early age - many are the 
children of violent, abusive or inadequate parents, some 
may have been removed into care. Many are poorly 
educated and have a history of difficulty in finding 
work and housing. In adult life they have difficulty 
forming meaningful relationships with others, frequently 
become involved in substance misuse, and suffer from 
depression or other mental illness. They are more likely 
than others to die violently by suicide or in accidents. 
So far no effective strategies have been identified to 
prevent development of severe personality disorder. 
(Home Office and DoH 1999:5) 
The intentions of this document might be seen as wholly 
honourable. Indeed, in 2000 the then Secretary of State 
appealed with seeming irritation, bordering on incredulity, 
to the conventions of mainstream medical practice by 
asserting  
Quite extraordinarily for a medical profession, the 
psychiatric profession has said that it will take on 
only patients whom it regards as treatable. If that 
philosophy applied anywhere else in medicine, no 
progress would be made in medicine. It is time that the 
psychiatric profession seriously examined its own 
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practices and tried to modernise them in a way that it 
has so far failed to do.  
 (Jack Straw: Hansard 26 October 2000 column 9) 
 
The notion that the boundaries of successful medical practice 
have only been extended by clinicians trying to treat 
difficult cases is intuitively persuasive, but it belies a 
central truth.  Conventional medical practice requires not 
only clinicians who are willing to offer treatment but also 
patients who are willing to be treated and who define their 
own conditions as in need of a remedy. People may not define 
their disorders as in need of treatment for all sorts of 
reasons that are understandable because that reasoning is 
part of the disorder; for example, an individual who believes 
in the power of herbal remedies or who defines an abnormal 
condition, perhaps the growth of a tumour, as normal for them 
may not seek help or may indeed actively resist treatment.  
Pearce and Pickard (2010) illustrate well how the obverse of 
this, treating patients as responsible agents in their own 
recovery and assisting patients to exercise their own 
‘willpower’ in a non-judgemental manner, can facilitate that 
recovery rather than impede it. Active patient engagement may 
be one key to recovery.  But people with severe personality 
disorder may not frequently, or even necessarily, define 
their disorders as being of in need of treatment. And whilst 
personality disordered patients may well be demanding of a 
general practitioner’s time and skills with respect to their 
own problematic behaviours, it is not evident that those who 
go on to commit serious offences were seeking such medical 
help prior to offending. Notably, of the sample of homicide 
perpetrators with personality disorder reported to the 
national confidential inquiry over a five year, 43% of them 
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had had no previous contact with mental health services 
(Appleby, Shaw, Kapur, Windfuhr, Ashton, Swinson and While 
2006).  
Of course treatment within psychiatry does not always require 
the consent of the patient.  This may be either because the 
patient is unable to give consent due to a lack of capacity 
(not usually a problem for these with personality disorder, 
but it may be a relevant factor – see below, in the case of 
Ian Brady) or because treatment can be imposed on a 
compulsory basis if the individual falls within the terms of 
the statute authorising such compulsory treatment for mental 
disorder.  Yet, at least in the UK, this has been perceived 
in recent times to be a problem in need of a legislative 
solution. 
Whilst it would be a hazardous exercise to determine how 
health care is rationed across the somatic-psychiatric 
spectrum (and even the notion of a broad divide, which a 
spectrum with extremes implies, is itself contested: Matthews 
1999) it might be crudely characterised as the use of queuing 
for those with somatic disorders and an expensive resort to 
compulsion for those with severe personality disorder.  And 
although there are seemingly insufficient resources to meet 
the demands of those with various forms of addictive and 
problematic behaviour who have not offended, or not offended 
with any great level of seriousness, one might conclude from 
the extremely generous financial resources put into the DSPD 
programme (Rutherford 2010) that it is the use of compulsion 
for a small number of individuals that attracts, and arguably 
skews, provision for those with personality disorder.  
That said, the figures on the use of compulsion under the 
Mental Health Act 1983 reveal something of a paradox. In its 
unamended form, which persisted for some 24 years, s.1(2) of 
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the Mental Health Act 1983 defined ‘psychopathic disorder’ as 
those with  
a persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or 
not including significant impairment of intelligence) 
which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously 
irresponsible conduct on the part of the person 
concerned.  
Although those with psychopathic disorder clearly could have 
been compulsorily treated very few were. Indeed, of 
compulsory admissions during the year 2007-8 there were 9,995 
admissions for those with mental illness and only 147 for 
those with psychopathic disorder.  Moreover, of those 147 
admissions the bulk (71) emanated from prisoners being 
transferred to hospital: the courts exercised their powers to 
send an offender direct to hospital, with or without a 
restriction order attached, on only 21 occasions.  Whether 
this suggests reluctance on the part of the court to use 
these orders, reluctance by clinicians to offer beds to the 
courts for these offenders, or some technical legal 
impediment, is not entirely clear. But it should be noted 
that the courts did make hospital orders, with or without 
restrictions, for 483 offenders suffering from mental illness 
during that year.  And it should also be noted that the legal 
impediment which the Mental Health Act 2007 was designed in 
part to address, namely the problematic treatability clause, 
may have existed as much in the minds of legislators as in 
reality. This is discussed further below.  For if the 
explanation does lie as much in clinical reluctance to take 
psychopathically disordered patients into hospital beds, one 
might question whether any quantity of haranguing of the 
profession by the relevant Secretary of State is likely to 
have made any difference.  
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A realist’s view: the political agenda 
Another way of looking at the DSPD initiative was to see it 
as part of a general programme of reforms aimed at protecting 
the public from the threats perceived to be posed by those 
suffering from severe personality disorder.  Consistent with 
this view would be the initial proposal that some individuals 
with severe personality disorder who had never offended, and 
who might be of questionable treatability, might nonetheless 
be subject to a programme of compulsory treatment. Although 
this particular proposal was never implemented in this form, 
it had always been possible under the Mental Health Act 1983 
that those suffering from the requisite disorders of 
personality could be admitted to a psychiatric hospital where 
they met the criteria for admission including showing 
‘abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct’: 
the latter notably implied offending but did not require it. 
Yet the figures given above suggest the power was rarely 
used.  So the DSPD initiative might have been aimed at making 
it easier to admit such patients or to encourage more 
frequent use of the powers for those who could already have 
been admitted.   
Certainly in recent years there has been a greater embracing 
of indeterminate powers; first through the introduction of 
‘Indeterminate Sentences for Public Protection’ under the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 and also by the assorted amendments 
to the Mental Health Act 1983.  These included broadening the 
definition of mental disorder, extending hybrid orders to all 
forms of mental disorder (the hybrid order allows the courts 
to send an offender first to hospital for treatment and then 
to prison to complete a sentence for the purposes of 
punishment), removing the notion of time limited restriction 
orders so that they all become indefinite orders and, 
critically, diluting the treatability requirement so that it 
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becomes not predictive but aspirational.  Thus, clinicians 
will no longer have to assert that treatment ‘is likely to 
alleviate or prevent a deterioration’ but rather that 
appropriate medical treatment is available, with the purpose 
of medical treatment being ‘to alleviate, or prevent a 
worsening of, the disorder or one or more of its symptoms or 
manifestations’ (Mental Health Act 1983 s. 145(4)). 
It should also be noted that the document referred to above 
‘Managing Dangerous People with Severe Personality Disorder: 
Proposals for Policy Development’ (Home Office/DoH 1999) as 
having honourable therapeutic intentions can be assessed 
against this risk-prevention agenda. As Toby Seddon 
(2008:307) observes ‘the language of risk pervades the 
official documentary discourse’ about DSPD: indeed, as he 
asserts the word ‘risk’ is used over 100 times in a 76 page 
document. However, in Seddon’s careful analysis the notion 
that the DSPD programme was based solely on risk is rejected. 
Rather, as he argues (2008:311), it involved a multi-faceted 
response which is  
at once political (designed to play on those public 
fears), instrumental (promising increased public safety 
through the use of institutional confinement) and deeply 
emotive (going to the heart of our most troubling 
anxieties about insecurity).  
 
Yet, as he further notes, the risk discourse embedded in the 
DSPD programme is instrumental in another way.  For, unlike 
comparator programmes for the civil confinement of sexual 
violent predators in other jurisdictions, most notably but 
not exclusively the USA, it does hold out the prospect of 
therapeutic engagement and was not intended to constitute 
mere preventive detention (Mercado and Ogloff 2007). Whether, 
of course, the best of these intentions are capable of being 
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fulfilled is another matter.  Eastman’s notion that the 
personality traits constituting the personality disorder 
‘are’ us, and can only be diagnosed as a disorder by 
assessing the severity of the symptoms against those of a 
normal population, rather than against what is normal for 
that individual, makes people with personality disorder 
peculiarly difficult in treatment terms (Select Committee on 
Home Affairs, 2000: para 176). Not only may these disorders 
be difficult (and contentious) to diagnose but they may also 
be, unlike conventional illness, highly resistant to change; 
developmental disorders thus cause particular problems for 
the law. And the early findings of the assessment of the DSPD 
programmes have not been encouraging, suggesting a morphing 
back to what arguably may be more akin to containment and 
less akin to the high aspirations held by DSPD programme 
evangelists, albeit that the development of such therapeutic 
endeavours has been welcomed (Tyrer, Cooper, Rutter, 
Sievewright, Duggan, Maden, Barrett, Joyce, Rao, Nur, 
Cicchetti, Crawford and Byford 2009, Tyrer, Duggan, Cooper, 
Crawford, Sievewright, Rutter, Maden, Byford and Barrett 
2010, Ramsay, Saradjian, Murphy and Freestone 2009). 
 
 
The professionals’ view: clinicians and the courts 
 
The law starts from the premise that all individuals have the 
capacity to make decisions about themselves: this is a 
presumption that can be rebutted.  Similarly, whilst 
psychiatrists may readily conclude that those with various 
mental illnesses or learning disabilities may lack decision-
making capacity with respect to particular decisions, for 
example the decision to refuse treatment, there is no such 
easy resolution with respect to those with personality 
disorder. Indeed, such disorders, broadly conceived as 
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enduring patterns of maladaptive traits which may even have 
their defining terms seen as encapsulating a lack of moral 
behaviour rather than some cognitive impairment (Charland 
2006), have not primarily been thought of as affecting an 
individual’s capacity to make decisions.  Yet problematic and 
other offending behaviour – actions and omissions on the 
individual’s part – are largely conceived as a product of the 
individual’s choosing; intervening to change these behaviours 
can be perceived not only as inherently unlikely to succeed, 
but also as ethically problematic where it may additionally 
entail the admission of criminal conduct which has not 
previously been admitted.  
 
However, Szmukler (2009) has questioned whether personality 
disorder may indeed affect one’s capacity to make decisions 
(and which may accordingly either create a basis to intervene 
against a patient’s seeming wishes or absolve someone from 
criminal culpability).  As he observes, clinicians are not 
infrequently faced with individuals in states of considerable 
arousal or distress, sometimes with suicidal intentions, 
where the clinician may wish to seek to override a decision 
to refuse treatment. Patients who have self-harmed, but who 
refuse life saving treatments, pose particular dilemmas for 
clinicians (see David, Hotopf, Moran, Owen, Szmukler and 
Richardson 2010), evidenced by a number of cases that have 
come before the courts. These arise in particular where a 
patient’s treatment refusal may lead to death.  Persistent 
self-harm involving personality disorder, or sometimes even 
harm to a foetus would be amongst those cases: such 
individuals occasionally have been held to be appropriately 
subject to a mental health intervention, where capacity or 
its absence is not a defining criterion (see for example B v 
Croydon Health Authority [1995] 1 All ER 683). Moreover, the 
approach of the courts to determining a lack decision-making 
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capacity, admittedly prior to the introduction of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005, has been sufficiently malleable 
potentially to include those with personality disorder: see, 
for example, St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1998] 3 
All ER 673 CA.  As noted above, these cases seem to arise 
most acutely where issues of harm to self or to others are 
entailed. It is accordingly tempting to ask whether the dire 
nature of the consequences that would follow from assessing 
an individual to have capacity, leads to that individual 
being assessed as not having capacity.  Or as Szmukler 
(2009:649) puts it, having observed the real difficulty in 
deciding and agreeing upon a threshold for attributing 
capacity ‘It is important to bear in mind a temptation for 
the clinician to raise the threshold when there is 
disagreement and when there are significant risks’.  Again, 
the advantages referred to earlier that accrue from employing 
a sliding scale of capacity – amongst others that its 
sensitivity can enhance autonomous choices - need to be set 
against the problems that can arise with the consistent 
application of any such scale when conflicting objectives are 
pursued. 
 
The context driven nature of this decision is illustrated by 
two similar cases which arose in respect of offenders 
convicted of murder but held in different locations; namely a 
secure psychiatric hospital and a prison.  These are the 
cases of Brady and W (see Peay 2010:140-143).  Both concerned 
individuals with diagnoses of personality disorder (or under 
the Mental Health Act 1983, ‘psychopathic disorder’), who 
sought to manipulate the situation in which they were 
detained by resort to self-harm: threatened in Brady’s case 
by the refusal of food, and in W’s case the refusal of needed 
treatment for self-inflicted injury.   
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The contrast in outcome could not be more stark.  In Brady’s 
case, whilst not strictly determinative since the court held 
that feeding him by force was a treatment that could be given 
without his consent under s.63 of the Mental Health Act 1983, 
the court did go on to consider whether he would have had the 
capacity to refuse treatment, and determined that he would 
not have had such capacity.  Evidence was given by Brady’s 
Responsible Medical Officer, who observed that Brady’s 
ability to weigh information (part of the test for 
determining whether someone had capacity with respect to a 
particular decision),  
was impaired by the emotions and perceptions he had at 
the time…. These emotions and perceptions were related 
to his personality disorder.  
 
Indeed, as he said in evidence  
 
His spectacles are blinkered…. Although he weighs facts, 
his set of scales are not calibrated properly in a whole 
range of things, especially related to Ashworth.    
(R v Collins and Ashworth Hospital ex parte Brady at 
para 59) 
 
Yet in the case of W, who had been transferred from prison to 
hospital (where his disorder was considered not to be 
amenable to treatment) and then back to prison, the 
prisoner’s decision to self-harm, by attempting to turn a 
self-inflicted leg wound septic, was held to be capacitous.  
As Butler-Sloss, the President of the High Court determined, 
the right of choice to refuse treatment could include 
‘manipulative reasons’ Re W (Adult: Refusal of Medical 
Treatment) [2002] EWHC 901.  In so doing she cited the case 
of Re T where the court had held that ‘The patient’s right of 
choice exists whether the reasons for making that choice are 
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rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent’ Re T 
(After refusal of treatment) [1993] Fam 95. Yet, notably, W’s 
psychopathic disorder was characterised by paranoid thinking 
and a loss of ability to accept responsibility for his own 
actions.  Such characteristics in another context might 
arguably have created a basis to maintain that he did not 
have the capacity to refuse treatment. 
 
There are a series of possible reasons why the two courts 
reached such contrasting decisions: these could include both 
the relative seniority of the judges involved, the 
consequences that would follow from a decision made either 
way (and the Brady case attracted considerable publicity due 
to the notoriety of the particular patient), and the luxury 
that the court in Brady did not need to base its decision on 
the issue of capacity since the fact that the offender was 
detained subject to the Mental Health Act 1983 made the 
imposition of feeding possible by this statutory route.  
However, questions remain about whether, as Szmukler 
suggests, the convenience of a sliding threshold for capacity 
in the case of those with personality disorder is perceived 
as a potential route out of a treatment difficulty.  And if 
this is so, what consequences might follow were the issue of 
personality disorder to be more rigorously examined in the 
context of questions about an individual’s capacity to make 
decisions about a particular issue. Are those with 
personality disorder not to enjoy the same protections in law 
as those with or without mental illness; or is it that the 
same sliding scale of convenience might apply to all of those 
with mental disorder no matter how labelled? 
 
It is notable that in Szmukler’s two case studies both were, 
given sufficient time in interaction with their clinician, 
held to have the capacity to make the requisite decision 
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despite having originally been in states where their 
decision-making might have been thought to be impaired. Quite 
what made the difference is unclear, but Szmukler does 
speculate that the lengthy process of assessing the patient’s 
capacity may in itself have been therapeutic (Szmukler 
2010:649).  It is fair to stress, of course, that in a number 
of the contested cases where personality disorder has been 
held to impair capacitous decision-making, there was some 
urgency to make the decision.  The notion that individuals 
with personality disorder (or indeed learning disability) can 
be brought to a state of understanding where they can be held 
to make capacitous decisions is very much in keeping with the 
notion that the treatments that are likely to be offered (and 
indeed, likely to be at all effective) are those that require 
the patient’s voluntary participation; namely various forms 
of cognitive or behavioural therapy, including group therapy 
and the therapeutic community approach.  And the situation is 
similar for offenders: treatment success for those with 
personality disorder has been most impressive at institutions 
like Grendon Prison, the prototype for therapeutic 
communities in this field, where prisoners volunteer to be 
transferred, and are not taken under compulsion (although the 
coercive pressure that the knowledge of indefinite detention 
in combination with the experience of conditions within the 
conventional prison system no doubt has some independent 
effect; Genders and Player 2010). Whether there may be a 
negative placebo effect arising out of the use of compulsion 
is an intriguing possibility that deserves fuller 
exploration. 
 
This leaves hanging the notion that the courts accept that 
capacitous decision-making can be based on irrational 
reasons.  As Craigie and Coram’s excellent analysis of the 
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problematic relationship between capacity and rationality 
observes (forthcoming)  
 
The law ... aims to preserve the patient’s right to 
determine their own course of treatment, even in the 
face of dissenting medical advice  
 
and this is in part because capacitous decisions that reflect 
the individual’s own goals, preferences and values are tied 
up with the selection of those treatment decisions that will 
best promote the patient’s well being.  In short, although 
one can disagree with a treatment decision, that decision may 
nonetheless be the best for that individual, given their 
values and objectives.  However, what approach should be 
adopted where the process of pursuing those objectives is 
deemed irrational, or the values themselves are distorted by 
cognitive or emotional impairments?  The law’s desire to 
preserve individual autonomy may result in privileging 
decisions that are capacitous in name, but do not reflect the 
individual’s true preferences.  This is a hard line to draw 
where autonomous decision-making is affected by illness so 
that it does not run its true path. But where it is affected 
by personality disorder and there is no clear distinction, 
other than a moral one judged by others, between the true 
path and the disordered path because the ‘personality 
disorder’ is central to the individual’s make-up, then the 
rational and the irrational, the capacitous and the 
incapacitous, are almost impossible to disentangle. 
 
In the same way in law that the unreasonableness of a mistake 
may be used by a jury to question whether the alleged mistake 
has been honestly made, thereby undermining the purity of the 
maxim that an honest mistake, no matter how unreasonable, 
provides a defense, decisions judged to be irrational by an 
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outside observer may cause the capacity of the individual to 
be more closely examined.  Yet this covert approach to the 
assessment of capacity runs counter to both the common law 
and statute (The Mental Capacity Act 2005 s1(4)) where unwise 
decisions (ie substantive outcomes) are not to be used in 
isolation to judge capacity since this would undermine the 
law’s very objective of protecting autonomous, albeit highly 
eccentric, decisions.   
  
 
A (limited) empiricist’s view 
 
Arriving at an empirical view of law and personality disorder 
is fraught: personality disorder has no agreed definition. 
Moreover, those definitions that exist are based on shifting 
sands, and sands that are likely to shift again with the 
revisions to be embodied in DSMV (Leader 2010, 2011).  
However, the broadening of definitions of mental disorder, 
and the inclusion of disorders that have not yet manifested 
themselves, potentially open up psychiatric defenses based on 
personality disorder.   
 
The law is not immune to such revisions either. For example, 
indefinite detention based on the potential for future harm 
already contributes significantly to the prison population 
(Rutherford 2010) and the recent changes to the law on 
diminished responsibility under the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009 makes ‘a recognised medical condition’ the gateway to 
the defense.  The terms thereafter to be satisfied include 
the substantial impairment of either the ability to 
understand one’s own conduct, or to form a rational judgment 
or exercise self-control (see generally s.52). And if self-
control is the limb to be employed then the abnormality of 
mental functioning has to have a causal connection with, or 
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constitute a significant contributory factor to, the 
defendant’s conduct.  The interaction of broadened clinical 
conditions with broadened legal defenses has yet to play 
itself out in practice; and just how, and whether, disorders 
of mental functioning will embrace those with personality 
disorder is not clear.  Notionally, they could include the 
aroused and distressed states discussed by Szmukler (2009) 
above.  
 
Yet, even within the relatively narrow field of DSPD, where 
definitions were agreed for admission to the new assessment 
and treatment units, the research evidence shows that these 
definitions have not been adhered to consistently (Tyrer, 
Cooper, Rutter, Sievewright, Duggan, Maden, Barrett, Joyce, 
Rao, Nur, Cicchetti, Crawford and Byford 2009) making any 
attempt to assess outcomes fraught.  Similarly, within the 
legal arena, the perceived impediment of the ‘treatability 
clause’ for those suffering from psychopathic disorder under 
the Mental Health Act 1983 proved a chimera, albeit one 
constituting not only a potential clinical ‘get-out’ clause 
but also grist for those intent on its legal abolition (see 
the saga of the Scottish cases discussed in Peay 2010 which 
illustrates how the treatability requirement has been so 
broadly interpreted by the courts as to be almost 
meaningless: the structured environment which facilitated 
anger management could itself be deemed ‘treatment’  
Hutchison Reid v Secretary of State for Scotland and another 
(1998) House of Lords, 3 December 1998). The gulf between 
clinical and legal theory, and their practice, makes any 
convincing empirical assessment improbable.   
 
However, there are empirical questions that can be asked even 
if they are unlikely to be answered.  Against what treatment 
or rehabilitative standards respectively are efforts in 
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hospitals and prisons to be assessed? If the primary 
objective is amelioration of the disorder in hospital and 
reduction in risk in prison, how is change to be evaluated 
and validated? What level of certainty in judgements is to be 
employed (see for example, Szmukler 2003, and Hart, Michie 
and Cooke 2007)?  What is to be done where successful 
treatment of the disorder may not be associated with 
reduction in risk; or where successful reduction in 
subsequent offending may nonetheless leave the disorder 
intact?  If the objective is greater control by the 
individual of his or her behaviour, how could this be tested 
where release mechanisms lie in the hands not of the 
clinicians/therapeutic agents who provide evidence for the 
existence of change, but in those of Tribunals and Parole 
Boards who make decisions against a statutory context 
embracing the absence of disorder and/or minimal risk-taking? 
 
Finally, from an empirical point of view the dilemmas for 
those dealing with those with personality disorder are more 
acute than for those with other mental disorders.  The 
correlations between severe personality disorder and violent 
behaviour are stronger than for those with mental illness 
generally, albeit that these correlations may derive as much 
from a definitional overlap as any underlying causative 
mechanism.  However, the consequence is that the area of 
manoeuvrability is much reduced between what is attributable 
to autonomous choice, or to an ingrained pattern of behaviour 
attributable to underlying personality traits, or to a life 
exposed to particular norms and values; or indeed the 
interaction between them, or all three of them.  
 
 
A normativist’s view 
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It is inevitable that people with personality disorder will 
find themselves in conflict with the law and do so in 
arguably more problematic ways than those with mental 
illnesses: the routine retention of capacitous decision-
making, possibly  in the context of behaviour which may not 
be wholly resistible or controllable, challenges the law’s 
mechanisms for determining who should and who should not be 
held criminally responsible; and who should and who should 
not be subject to a paternalistic-based form of state 
intervention. Such elements of qualified determinism are 
particularly challenging. The chequered history in the United 
States of the Model Penal Code’s framework for the insanity 
defense, with its exclusion of those engaging in repeated 
anti-social conduct, is testament to these difficulties (see, 
for a detailed analysis, Sinnott-Armstrong and Levy 2011). 
Yet, the desire of legislators to address the problems of 
self-harm, and harm to others, make resolving those problems 
an understandable objective.  But what limits should there be 
on this interventionist agenda?  Limits imposed by what is 
known to be possible, or what might be achieved were more 
efforts or more innovative strategies to be involved?  The 
innovative route risks intervening in the lives of those 
where intervention is not justified, and may be 
counterproductive. Furthermore, the negative effects of 
stereotyping combined with the potential for undermining 
whatever benefits intervention might bring through a negative 
placebo effect – making change less likely in the context of 
compulsory treatment – should all make legislators wary of 
too bold an approach. 
 
Restraint in intervention based on principles of fairness and 
respect for human dignity are, of course, those embodied in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Here is not the 
place for a considered examination of those issues: suffice 
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it to say that if intervention for people with personality 
disorder is to depart from agreed norms on the basis that 
therapeutic endeavour may bring benefits, it should require 
limits to such intervention based on accepted principles. As 
matters currently stand, neither the Mental Health Act 1983 
nor its combination with the European Convention on Human 
Rights can do much to prevent preventive detention, although 
challenges might be mounted on grounds of lack of proven 
efficacy were treatment endeavours demonstrated to be wholly 
aspirational. Arguably, if intervention is based on grounds 
of disorder, then the law ought to regulate length of 
intervention by reference to the Winterwerp criteria 
(Winterwerp v the Netherlands (1979-80) 2 EHRR 387). If 
detention is based on grounds of offending behaviour, then 
the length of such intervention should be determined 
prospectively: parliament should determine the framework in 
advance so that potential offenders have fair warning, with 
sentencers taking due account of individual circumstances 
after the offence has been proven. Arguably, the most 
defensible approach is based on a form of ‘just deserts’; 
namely, a degree of proportionately between the harm caused 
or risked and the extent of the intervention.  And future 
detention, if indeterminacy is permitted at all, should be 
based on demonstrable risk, perhaps using a variant of 
Bottoms and Brownsword’s (1983:21) concept of ‘vivid danger’; 
namely, that protective sentences need to be justified with 
reference to the seriousness of harm arising out of the 
predicted behaviour, its temporality (ie how frequently the 
behaviour is predicted to occur over what period of time and 
how immediate is the first predicted act?) and its certainty, 
that is, with what confidence is the prediction made?  
Moreover, in the unlikely event that it can be proved to the 
requisite standard that the offending behaviour has been 
caused by an underlying disorder, then those with personality 
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disorder ought to dealt with according to the normal 
principles of culpability; and if culpability cannot be 
established then a non-punitive (and possibly therapeutic) 
disposal should follow.    
 
Of course, the argument of this article has been that those 
with severe personality disorder do not fit neatly into any 
of these categories.  Perhaps it suffices to conclude that we 
should be vigilant of this range of principles when dealing 
with those with personality disorder. 
 
 
Awkward questions for the law 
 
To reiterate, these awkward questions for the law may be 
summarised briefly. 
 
First, how can clinical and legal concepts of capacity be 
reconciled where individuals are diagnosed with severe forms 
of personality disorder?  
 
Second, how do legal concepts of capacity intersect with 
concepts employed by the criminal law to absolve potential 
offenders of culpability based on an absence of reason?  
 
Third, how should the law respond to those with severe forms 
of personality disorder who exceptionally may not have the 
capacity to have ‘knowledge of wrong’ as required under the 
M’Naghten Rules; exceptionally because, in England and Wales, 
this has largely been interpreted as knowledge of legal 
wrong?  For those with personality disorder a further aspect 
of this problem arises; if their capacity to appreciate moral 
wrong is impaired, albeit that they understand at a cognitive 
level what the law defines as wrong, should they nonetheless 
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be included within the framework of protection offered by the 
insanity defense?  
 
Fourth, how do legal concepts of autonomy, self-control and 
choice fit where those with severe personality disorder may 
have their ability to control themselves impaired (or 
diminished) but not extinguished? 
 
It would, of course, be all too easy to consign those with 
severe personality disorder either to the honourable 
ministrations of those with high therapeutic ideals or to 
resign oneself to the notion that, as this is a group for 
whom the public may not naturally deem deserving of sympathy, 
little need be done beyond their safe containment. Examined 
carefully, neither is a comfortable or justifiable outcome. 
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